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Dr. Martha Nussbaum |
Certainly one of the worst old problems
of our world is religious intolerance and hatred. Already in the third
century B. C., the Indian emperor Ashoka, himself a convert to Buddhism
from Hinduism, put forward edicts instituting mutual respect and
toleration as official policy. The nations of Europe lagged behind, but
by the seventeenth century they, too, had discovered these useful
ideas. John Locke’s influential A Letter Concerning Toleration set out
norms of mutual respect and equal citizenship that were influential not
only in Europe but especially in America, where James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson built them into the U. S. Constitution. By our time, the idea
of a pluralism that shows respect to all religious groups, protecting
religious liberty and promoting equal conditions of citizenship, is a
major pillar of virtually all the world’s liberal democracies.
Religious freedom is a major part of all international human rights
documents and of constitutions the world over – prominently including
the Constitution of India, which has even more elaborate protections for
religious freedom than does ours.
And yet, intolerance flourishes in virtually every nation. In 2002,
India saw the hideous Gujarat riots, in which public officials and the
police actively collaborated. By now the Indian Supreme Court has
condemned the government of the state for its role, and the national
government that passively aided the violence has gone to electoral
defeat; and yet violence remains a looming possibility, and victims who
try to bring the perpetrators to account in court have faced an uphill
battle. Europe has recently seen a frightening rebirth of anti-Semitism
and also of anti-Muslim feeling. In Holland, in Germany, in France,
ugly violent incidents are becoming more common. Prejudice against
Muslims and a tendency to equate Islam with terrorism are all too
prominent in the U. S., a nation of immigrants that ought to know
better, since so many of our citizens, early and late, arrived her in
flight from religious persecution. Every member of the Hindu right
whom I have interviewed for my book has assumed that I, as an American,
will already be on their side when they say that Muslims cannot be good
citizens, when they assert that Muslims are a danger wherever they
are. And of course Hindus too have been victims of violence and
intolerance throughout the ages, and even today in some parts of the
world. And Muslims have themselves been perpetrators of violence in
the name of religion, as well as its victims.
Why is religious intolerance so persistent? And what can modern
democracies do about it? The desire to assert supremacy over others is
a deeply rooted tendency in human beings. Immanuel Kant called this
tendency “radical evil,” and he thought that people were just born that
way: put them together in a group, and they will immediately begin to
vie for domination. I myself would prefer to connect this tendency to a
deeper human insecurity about frailty and helplessness. We are
intelligent creatures who, from an extremely early age, are aware of an
extremely great weakness and helplessness toward things of the highest
importance, such as food, love, and life itself. It is not surprising
if ambitious intelligent beings, in a situation of helplessness, should
react by striking back at the world, so to speak, attempting to create
security in the midst of insecurity. Forming a dominant group that
controls the course of life in your region is one very good way to
create at least temporary security, all the more if that group can
define itself as good, and its opponents as inferior or even evil. By
subordinating others, people can forget for a time the weakness and
mortality that they share with those they oppress.
Religion has many roles in human life, many of them extremely valuable.
Religions help people cope with loss and the fear of death; they teach
moral principles and give motivation to follow those. They are sources
of community in a world of loneliness and alienation. But just because
religions are such powerful sources of morality and community, they can
all too easily become vehicles for the desire to create security that
Kant called “radical evil” and that I might call the flight from
helplessness, so often bound up with oppression and hierarchy. When
people bond together in a religious group, the very religious nature of
the bond makes it all the easier for them to represent outsiders as
evil. And the fact that religions usually teach that only one religion
is helpful for salvation, perhaps even for overcoming death, suggests
that those who don’t believe are damned, and maybe evil, in the sense
that allowing them to go free in society is to threaten the salvation of
others. It is impossible to live at peace with those whom you believe
to be damned, said Rousseau. Well, it may not be impossible, but it is
surely very difficult.
Rousseau’s own solution to this problem was to promulgate a “civil
religion” in his imaginary republic, which included the idea of
theological toleration: everyone is saved, so long as they also accept
the other patriotic views that Rousseau added to his civil religion.
People who wouldn’t accept these beliefs could be banished or even
executed. He was well aware that in his ideal republic all Roman
Catholics and most Protestants would not be able to live, but he thought
that it is “impossible to live at peace with those whom you believe to
be damned,” so he felt that his coercive vigilance was worth its price.
Rousseau was wrong. His cure is as bad as the disease of intolerance.
Modern liberal-democratic states rightly prize religious liberty and
freedoms of speech and association. Even when people are religiously
intolerant, so long as they do not actually harm others (or, perhaps,
threaten imminent harm), the state should protect their freedom, as well
as that of the tolerant. But is there, then, nothing to be done about
“radical evil” and the intolerance to which it so frequently leads?
One big part of combating religious intolerance is good laws. Most
modern democracies give minority religions strong legal and
constitutional protection. The part of the U. S. Constitution that
tells us that all citizens have the right to the “free exercise of
religion” has operated over the years to protect Quakers, Jews,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and many other minorities from laws that
would require them to violate their consciences, for example by serving
in the military when their religion is pacifist, or by working on
Saturday when that is their religion’s holy day. This part of the
Constitution has not always worked well: judges are afraid of what is
new and strange, and Mormonism and native American religion, in
particular, have been given very unfair treatment in our nation’s
history, as have the claims of Jehovah’s Witnesses to be free from
imposed ceremonies that they regard as idolatrous, such as the
compulsory flag salute. Much of the time, however, something works:
minority groups eventually achieve the protections that the Constitution
promises them.
Equally important is the clause in the Constitution that says that
Congress shall make “no law respecting an Establishment of religion.”
People today sometimes have the idea that our traditional separation of
church and state expresses hostility to religion, or is a way of
marginalizing religion, even expressing the view that religion is not
important. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Founders of the
United States believe that religion was extremely important. They also
believed that allowing government to take a stand in religious matters
would prove very damaging: it would corrupt religion by making it a part
of state bureaucracy; it would corrupt government by making religious
animosities part of daily political life. Above all, a point James
Madison stressed most vigorously, it would turn the equality of citizens
into hierarchy. When the government makes statements expressing the
thought that ours is a Christian nation, for example, non-Christians are
cast as unequal players in the civic drama. They do not enter the
polity “on equal conditions,” to use Madison’s words. That is the very
shift that the Hindu right in India would like to see: they would like
to define India as essentially a Hindu nation, and minorities feel,
rightly, that this would cast them as unequal citizens.
But law is only one part of the solution to the problem I have
described. An even more crucial part is education, which forms the
hearts and minds of young citizens, and thus provides law with essential
support and life. I now want to argue that our traditional concept of
liberal education is well placed to advance religious respect and
equality. I’ll focus only on the college and university part, but of
course these elements of learning have essential roots in earlier years.
Here at UNC Asheville, you have not only prepared yourselves for jobs,
you have also received a liberal education. What does that mean? Well,
in its most general form, it means an education for freedom, an
education that “liberates” your minds so that you can take charge of
your own thinking and become people who stand for something, not passive
mouthpieces for tradition and habit.
Three capacities, above all, are essential to a liberal education in
today's world, and they are all, I believe, built into the structure of
your education at UNC Asheville. First is the capacity for critical
examination of oneself and one's traditions -- for living what,
following Socrates, we may call "the examined life." This means a life
that accepts no belief as authoritative simply because it has been
handed down by tradition or become familiar through habit, a life that
questions all beliefs and accepts only those that survive reason's
demand for consistency and for justification. Training this capacity
requires developing the capacity to reason logically, to test what one
reads or says for consistency of reasoning, correctness of fact, and
accuracy of judgment. Testing of this sort frequently produces
challenges to tradition, as Socrates knew well when he defended himself
against the charge of "corrupting the young." But he defended his
activity on the grounds that democracy needs citizens who can think for
themselves rather than simply deferring to authority, who can reason
together about their choices rather than just trading claims and
counter-claims. Like a gadfly on the back of a noble but sluggish
horse, he said, he was waking democracy up so that it could conduct its
business in a more reflective and reasonable way. Our democracy, like
ancient Athens, is prone to hasty and sloppy reasoning, and to the
substitution of invective for real deliberation. We need Socratic
teaching to fulfill the promise of democratic citizenship. Your
courses in critical thinking and in other related areas, Philosophy
above all, fulfill this promise.
Citizens who cultivate their humanity need, further, an ability to see
themselves as not simply citizens of some local region or group but
also, and above all, as human beings bound to all other human beings by
ties of recognition and concern. We very easily think of ourselves in
group terms -- as Americans first and foremost, as human beings second
-- or, even more narrowly, as Protestants or Catholics or Hindus or
Muslims first, Americans second, and human beings third if at all. We
neglect needs and capacities that link us to fellow citizens who live at
a distance, or who look different from ourselves. This means that we
are unaware of many prospects of communication and fellowship with them,
and also of responsibilities we may have to them. Cultivating our
humanity in a complex interlocking world involves understanding the ways
in which common needs and aims are differently realized in different
circumstances. This requires a great deal of knowledge that American
college students rarely got in previous eras, knowledge of non-Western
cultures, and also of minorities within their own, of differences of
gender and sexuality. I would emphasize particularly the importance of
having an adequate knowledge of all the major world religions, so that
simplistic stereotypes of Islam, or any other religion, would be
subjected to the full complexity of history and the nuances of internal
debate. Your diversity courses, your emphasis on foreign languages, and
your other international offerings fulfill this part of my proposal.
But citizens cannot think well on the basis of factual knowledge alone.
The third ability of the citizen, closely related to the first two, can
be called the narrative imagination. This means the ability to think
what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from
oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person's story, and to
understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed
might have. The narrative imagination is not uncritical: for we always
bring ourselves and our own judgments to the encounter with another, and
when we identify with a character in a novel, or a distant person whose
life story we imagine, we inevitably will not merely identify, we will
also judge that story in the light of our own goals and aspirations.
But the first step of understanding the world from the point of view of
the other is essential to any responsible act of judgment, since we do
not know what we are judging until we see the meaning of an action as
the person intends it, the meaning of a speech as it expresses something
of importance in the context of that person's history and social world.
The third ability you have attained in your education here – through
integrative liberal studies, interdisciplinary courses, and the strong
emphasis on the role of the arts -- is the ability to decipher such
meanings through the use of the imagination. And I think it is in some
ways the most essential of all, if we are to work toward a world in
which we see distant lives as spacious and deep, rather than simply as
occasions for enrichment.
How might someone like Mr. Shastri have been changed by an education of
this sort? Well, of course there will always be bad people in the
world, and no education can completely remove the propensity to lord it
over others, or even to use violence in the service of one’s own ends.
But so much of what Mr. Shastri said to me shows a complete absence of
critical reflection. A paranoid view of society was expressed and not
tested. Nor did he have a deep or adequate knowledge of Islam and
Christianity: that is why he could demonize them so easily. Finally,
what he most especially seemed to me to lack was the ability to imagine
the pain of another person, an ability that would have made it far more
difficult for him to accept with equanimity acts of violence, rape, and
torture.
Modern societies need all the help they can get if they are going to
combat the religious tensions that are such a painful part of our
current situation, as they have been of humanity’s entire history. We
need the help of good laws. But also, and above all, we need the active
minds of young people, informed and stimulated by a liberal education,
if we are ever to live in a world in which we confront the tendencies to
humiliation, oppression, and hatred that will always be with us, in the
name of a future of equal respect and brotherhood. Congratulations.
May you take what you have learned into the world, and create that
future.
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